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Abstract—Modeling technology policy is becoming an 
increasingly important capability to steer states and societies 
toward` sustainability.  This paper presents a simulation-
modeling approach to evaluate renewable energy readiness, 
that is, the ability to develop renewable energy, taking into 
account critical ecological, economic, governance, and 
institutional factors that generally shape energy policy. While 
the dynamics underlying shifts towards renewable energy are 
generic, we focus on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a 
counter-intuitive case.  The UAE is a major oil rich and oil 
exporting country, with large untapped reserves. Yet it has 
made a policy decision to develop sources of renewable energy.  
The absence of basic institutional, managerial, and 
infrastructure requirements creates major barriers that must 
be surmounted if this policy is to be effectively pursued. For 
these and other reasons, the UAE serves as a “hard test” for 
the potentials of renewable energy and can eventually be used 
as a model for other oil exporting countries. The UAE has 
already made strides along a trajectory in trial and error ways.  
As such, it helps demonstrate in theory and practice the 
readiness for renewable energy—that can help articulate 
effective policy trajectories. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 The recent expansion of renewable energy use around 
the world, coupled with an emergent consensus of concerns 
that are collectively referred to as the quest for sustainable 
development (Choucri et al, 2007) has created an extensive 
literature of various aspects of renewable energy. Broadly 
stated, our goal is to identify, describe, and design methods 
to support technology policy in the energy domain, with 
special attention to the factors that shape the readiness for 
renewable energy (RE-readiness).  This means that we must 
identify and determine how to overcome critical barriers.  
Since one size seldom fits all, this also leads to a customized 
renewable energy strategy. Our approach recognizes the 
complex realities created by different perspectives of the 
renewable energy issue and potential consequences, when: 
(a) viewed from a policy context;  
(b) represented in analytical form;  
(c) signaled by empirical indicators; and  
(d) based on alternative contingencies.  
  
We define RE-readiness as the ability to pursue 
renewable energy creation opportunities taking into account 
critical ecological, economic, governance, and institutional 
dimensions. This definition is designed to provide 
systematic guidelines for specific policy challenges, 
facilitate comparisons and case studies, enable useful 
matching of abilities for renewable energy, on the one hand, 
with opportunities, on the other, and create an architecture 
for the development of innovative RE-readiness tools (such 
as simulation models) to test approach and the results of 
RE-readiness.  
 
In order to represent the foundations of RE-readiness, 
we draw on the propensities for knowledge creation or use 
of relevant knowledge in the information technology 
domain, generally referred to as e-readiness. With the rapid 
diffusion of the Internet worldwide, there has been 
considerable interest in e-readiness, the ability to pursue 
value creation opportunities facilitated by the use of the 
Internet (Maugis et al., 2005). Initiatives pertaining to e-
readiness include: the Economist Intelligence Unit annual E-
readiness ranking of the world's largest economies since 
2000 to measure a country's accumulated telecoms and 
computer infrastructure; the United Nations Public 
Administration Network Global E-Government Readiness 
Survey; and the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment 
Methodology, among other E-readiness assessments. 
(Ghavamifar et al., 2008)  Underlying e-readiness is an 
implicit expectation that successful applications, such as e-
business and e-commerce (however defined) can take place 
if, and only if, emergent initiatives are built on robust 
foundations of readiness. 
 
By necessity, such imperatives must be based on 
relevant knowledge, because knowledge is at the foundation 
of technology in mechanical and organizational terms. 
Given the paucity of knowledge on renewable energy policy 
for resource rich countries, it was essential to frame and 
develop the concept of RE-readiness to guide our 
investigations.  
 
To begin with, RE-readiness means that three 
objectives must be pursued in order to put the critical 
readiness conditions in place. First is to define the technical 
and scientific goals, namely to sharpen the prevailing 
understanding of renewable energy issues, facilitate access 
to evolving cutting edge scientific and technical 
information, applications and innovations, and select among 
feasible technology options.  Second is to create broader 
engagement, specifically helping to generate, support, and 
maintain an integrated and adaptive perspective on 
renewable energy at all levels of development. Third is to 
clarify the policy-centered goals at all levels. Nationally, the 
policy related purpose is to engage in implementation of 
international and local initiatives, as framed for example in 
the United Nation’s Agenda 21 and by the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).  
 
Framed thus, these RE-readiness objectives are both 
general in scope and specific in applications. From a policy 
perspective, they concern the ability of governments to 
management knowledge, engage relevant stakeholders, and 
adjust and respond to new knowledge. We next turn briefly 
to the specific Renewable Energy plans of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and examine their development over a 
multi-year period.  While the country has made it its stated 
goal to transition in part to renewables, it faces critical 
tensions in its ability to develop and harness these basic 
drivers for RE-readiness.  
II. UAE RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY  
The United Arab Emirates is one of the major 
petroleum exporting countries of the Middle East. It shares 
with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia some fundamental features, 
like a small population relative to its resource base, and a 
rapidly growing modern sector of the economy, due to its 
oil wealth. And there are other common features, including 
language, culture, history and the like.  But unlike the other 
two countries, the leadership of its capital and largest 
Emirate, Abu Dhabi, has begun to coordinate and define its 
energy policy for the 21st century, including a systematic 
approach to establish a renewable energy sector. 
 
This strategy is entirely consistent with two important 
trends. First is the consolidation of worldwide 
environmental concerns, with more attention to cleaner 
production, environmental remediation, reduced waste, and 
the like.  Second is an emergent consensus, transcending 
matters of environment, to incorporate a wide range of 
concerns that are referred to as the quest for sustainable 
development. While theory and reality seldom align, the 
discrepancy is especially salient in the domain of 
“sustainable development.”  The UAE must reduce the gap 
between the policy formulation and its effective 
implementation. The UAE shares with other rich countries 
the usual close coupling of energy use, economic activity, 
and environmental degradation. But unlike other prosperous 
countries, energy production in the UAE is largely to meet 
external demand—the consumptions of people elsewhere.  
III. THE MASDAR INITIATIVE 
To a considerable degree, the future of Abu Dhabi rests 
on the success of the Masdar Initiative by the Abu Dhabi 
Future Energy Company (ADFEC).  The overall direction is 
captured in a recent press release: “The emirate of Abu 
Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, has been a 
leader in the field of hydrocarbons for nearly half a century. 
One of Masdar's primary objectives is to build upon Abu 
Dhabi's energy leadership and develop an entirely new 
domestic economic sector built on energy innovation and 
intellectual property, thereby establishing the Emirate as the 
regional and global center of future energy solutions.” 
(Masdar Press Release, 2008) 
 
The Masdar Initiative is also seen as a vehicle for 
transitions to an entirely new economic sector in Abu Dhabi 
around renewable industries, based on economic 
diversification and on knowledge-based industries.  These 
are clearly ambitious goals, ones that few countries if any 
have been able to manage with any degree of success.  With 
the stated plan in mind, we seek to revisit core assumptions 
embedded within the Masdar Initiative (both implicitly and 
explicitly), examine the history of the project to date, and 
evaluate current and future plans within the UAE context.  
IV. SELECT RESULTS  
Of the many activities and results throughout the course 
of our research, we signal below two of the most important 
aspects.  The first is the development of a narrative-based 
record of the evolution of the renewable energy policy (i.e., 
the RE project history.) Early on, we realized that the 
background record, the technical materials, and the policy 
documents were limited, making it difficult to understand 
the contours, parameters, and investments envisaged—let 
alone the manpower and other essential inputs required. 
Developing the RE project history became essential because 
a fully substantiated record of the UAE record on policy 
deliberations and decision was incomplete and often highly 
inconsistent.  
 
The second significant set of results is the application 
of simulation techniques, anchored in this reconstructed 
history, in order to derive the critical parameters needed to 
better understand and represent RE-readiness in the UAE 
context, its evolution, the critical impediments, and the 
eventual process of “getting on track.”  We utilize the 
system dynamics methodology, an approach for modeling 
and simulating (via computer) complex physical and social 
systems and experimenting with the models to design 
policies for management and change. The core of the 
modeling strategy is representation of system structure in 
terms of stocks and of flows. Causal connections are the 
building blocks for articulating the dynamics of these 
models and their interactions can represent and explain 
system behavior. Created by Jay Forrester, system dynamics 
modeling (SDM) has been used as a method of analysis, 
modeling and simulation for over 50 years.  
 
To illustrate these dynamics, we highlight below the 
development of the UAE’s renewable energy policy as 
represented in three different plans put forth in August 
2008, May 2009, and February 2010 respectively. 
A. The August 2008 Plan 
The first plan, dated August 8, 2008, can best be seen as 
a baseline. We have reconstructed its content based on 
interviews with key personnel at the Masdar Institute. This 
plan reflects the initial view of RE-policy and focused on 
the concentrated solar power rollout but without extensive 
consideration for its eventual implementation. The general 
objective was to build a 100-megawatt concentrated solar 
power (CSP) facility each year for three years, beginning in 
2010, and then later construct a 200-megawatt facility each 
year for the subsequent eight years. Additional key elements 
of the plan include (a) the peak demand forecast, taken from 
the ADWEC Winter 2007/2008 Demand Forecast, and (b) 
the implied reduction in CO2 Emissions from CSP, which 
are calculated as 7.78 x 10-4 metric tons CO2 / kWh using 
USEPA data. On the basis of the above logic alone, we 
constructed the first representation of the RE-UAE 
simulation policy model shown in Fig. 1. It focuses on the 
elements signaled in the plan. We have utilized the system 
dynamics methodology and notation to render basic plan 
assumptions as they were designed, utilizing stock and flow 
diagrams  
 
Fig. 1. renders the basic connections embedded in the 
core plan using the system dynamics modeling 
methodology, without the added computational that are 
usually needed at this stage, which usually involve 
unpacking the implicit logic driving the. This unpacking is 
important in order to discover as early as possible any flaws 
in the overall policy and strategy.  For example, the August 
8 plan is remarkably silent on multiple-order effects, that is, 
it is not giving any attention to feedback dynamics in the 
overall framework nor on the core assumptions upon which 
it is based. At this point, however, we can only identify the 
broad areas of focus of the intended plan as well as the 
general concerns as conceived at the time. 
 
Figure 1. August 2008 Plan 
When represented in system dynamics terms, this first 
plan consists of the following building blocks: a) increases 
in the cumulative CSP capacity, and b) changes in peak 
energy demand. Given growth in CSP capacity and solar 
generation, the percentage of demand met by CSP would 
rise (‘Percentage from CSP’) and the Total Emissions would 
fall (‘Total Emissions Using CSP.’)  In addition, the plan 
assumed that at least seven percent of the Emirate's power 
generation capacity will come from renewable energy 
sources by 2020. While there appears to be no basis for this 
assumption, the target provided a critical anchor for 
policymaking and drove the original planning assumptions.  
 
Simulating this basic model over time we show the 
projected cumulative CSP capacity enabled by this logic 
(Fig. 2), the projected total emissions included the use of 
CSP (Fig. 3), and the percentage demand thereof (Fig 4). 
Taken as a whole, these Figures signal important insights 
for assessing RE-readiness. Each of the Figures show very 
different modes of behavior. Fig. 2. indicates a linear 
increase in capacity before leveling in the project out years.  
Fig. 3. shows an exponential increase in energy demand; 
and Fig. 4. shows a rise but subsequent decline in 
percentage of CSP. Together, these figures show the 
mismatch between demand and supply embedded in the 
August 2008 plan.   
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Figure 2. Cumulative CSP Capacity, August 2008  
Total Emissions Using CSP (MT CO2/year) 
 
Figure 3. Total Emissions, August 2008  
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Figure 4. Percentage from CSP, August 2008  
In retrospect, the August 2008 plan was not well 
articulated, as it did not contextualize the essential features 
of the renewable energy situation in the UAE: it did not 
capture complete technology specification, such as the 
direct normal irradiation (DNI) resource, a key component 
in calculating ‘Solar Generation’ (DNI would later be 
discovered to be lower than originally assumed); it did not 
consider factors driving the ‘demand growth rate’; and there 
was an absence of the supporting policy mechanisms, such 
as a subsidy policy. 
 
Despite these limitations, the first plan was a key step 
in a new transition to renewable energy. Eventually, to 
varying degrees, these critical limitations would be 
addressed by the UAE government.  But the August 2008 
plan also established critical tensions that will remain 
throughout the project phases. For example, Figure 1.4. 
shows that while the policy-target for percentage of demand 
met by CSP generation rises in the early years, given the 
limited planning horizon it falls in the later years of the 
plan, as early renewable energy generation is swamped by 
overall rising energy demand.  
 
Overall, the August 2008 plan was characterized by 
incomplete planning, limited time horizons, and lack of 
coordinating mechanisms, and in sum, limited RE-
readiness. Yet it was an important step for an oil exporting 
country, such as the UAE, in which traditional pressures 
towards renewable energy would be expected to be low and 
where there is little experience with RE technologies. 
B. The May 2009 Plan 
The 2009 plan introduced three major changes. First, 
when the design of CSP plant was shown to the UAE 
government for approval, the estimate used to calculate 
kilowatt-hour cost was relatively low.  However, with the 
completion of subsequent work, the figure went up 
substantially (by several reported estimates.) At this point, 
concern was raised about the logic underpinning the current 
plan, given the demonstrated lack of progress towards CSP 
deployment. As of May 2009, the first CSP plant had not 
yet begun construction. This confirmed the limited degree of 
RE-readiness displayed in the August 2008 plan. In 
response to a new understanding of these realities, the May 
2009 plan was adjusted so that it would begin CSP 
deployment in 2011, with 100-megawatt facilities being 
built each year for five years, and 200-megawatt facilities 
being built for the subsequent five years, adopting a longer 
time horizon. 
 
The second important change pertained to subsidies. 
For the first time, the plan explicitly recognized the 
potential role of subsidies.   The May 2009 plan is shown in 
Fig. 5.  New features of the plan captured in Fig. 5 include: 
the new (though incomplete) policy mechanism of subsidies 
(‘Subsidy Requires’); new calculation inputs for solar 
generation (‘plant capacity factor’) and CO2 emissions 
reduction (‘natural gas reduction’) and (‘solar thermal’); and 
new inputs to energy demand growth (‘effect desalination 
on demand growth.’) This shows increasing complexity of 
technology considerations, accounting for both the CO2 
emissions reduction from saving natural gas as well as the 
minor but important solar thermal increase; the explicit 
recognition of the role of government support, given the 
current estimate of price for solar generation (‘cost of solar 
production’) and the price of conventional production 
(‘conventional cost of production’); and additional factors 
influencing energy demands, namely the rising demand 
from water needs (‘effect of desalination on demand 
growth’).  
 
 
Figure 5. The May 2009 Plan 
Given these additional and expanded planning 
assumptions, we see a different trajectory for RE 
deployment from the earlier plan (Fig. 6) but also the rising 
subsidy burden (Fig. 7). 
 
Cumulative CSP Capacity (Megawatts) 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative CSP Capacity, May 2009 
Subsidy Required (USD, Million) 
 
Figure 7. Subsidies, May 2009 
The sum, the changes in the May 2009 plan are clearly 
important: they provide for meeting the governments’ stated 
renewable energy goals and as well as adopting a longer 
time horizon. However, the thinking regarding subsidies is 
incomplete, as the plan again does not identify key 
feedback, which account for the rapidly escalating subsidy 
burden. The normal implied logic here is that the subsidies 
initially required to drive down the prices for renewables 
(below those for non-renewable energy sources) will 
diminish over time, and the resulting subsides will be more 
effective at increasing the supply of renewables over time. 
In this case, the government does not merely encourage 
consumption (the status quo of traditional demand 
supported subsidies), it could potentially drive a virtuous 
feedback loop in the expansion of renewables that promotes 
movement towards sustainability. The strength of this loop, 
however, is dependent on the rate at which renewables can 
be supplied and costs lowered. For example, if RE projects 
stagnate the required subsidies will remain high and their 
effect constant.  The May 2009 plan does not consider this 
mechanism in detail. While the inclusion of subsidies is an 
important step towards the policy consideration necessary 
for RE-readiness, the lack of project planning and 
coordination ability that accounted for the changing 
estimates of costs shows underlying limitations in overall 
RE-readiness. 
C. The January 2010 Plan 
The next plan occurred in January 2010. Fig. 8 shows 
the January 2010 plan. The most important change was a 
core shift in technology choice – the inclusion of 
photovoltaic (PV) capacity, as well a fleshed out view of 
subsidies. Other new features of the January 2010 include: 
addition of two types of photovoltaic deployment (‘PV 
Utility Scale’) and (‘PV Small Scale’); additional costs 
calculations for subsidies; and planned for reduction in 
subsidies required. We explore several simulations for the 
January 2010 plan. The results show that the goal of 1,500 
MW Solar power plants is achieved in 2020 (Fig. 9); instead 
of solely relying on CSP technology, the plan now calls for 
the deployment of both utility scale PV (Fig. 10) and small 
scale PV (Fig. 11). 
 
Figure 8. The January 2010 Plan  
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Figure 9. Total RE Capacity, January 2010 Plan  
Cumulative PV Capacity (Megawatts) 
 
Figure 10. PV Utility Scale Capacity, January 2010 Plan 
Cumulative Small Scale Capacity (Megawatts) 
 
Figure 11. PV Small Scale Capacity, January 2010 Plan  
There also is a key shift in the calculations of subsidies 
due to technology choice (Fig. 12). Given static assumptions 
(fixed price per kilowatt hour), the total subsidies are now 
nearly halve of those in the May 2009 plan, mostly due to 
the shift to Utility Scale PV, which has a lower cost of 
production. For the first time, the RE plan incorporates 
endogenous drivers of renewable energy deployment, 
namely cost reductions from gaining experience.  
 
Subsidy Required (USD, Million) 
 
Figure 12. Total RE Subsidies, January 2010 Plan  
Overall, the January 2010 plan shows an important 
development in RE-readiness. It includes a more detailed 
rendering of technology choice, expands participation by the 
inclusion of PV technologies, which are becoming more 
cheaper and available to a wider audience than CSP, and 
more detailed policy planning on subsidies. However the 
late switch to alternative technologies shows the underlying 
lack or RE-readiness in earlier project phases, and the 
erosion of renewable energy goals in the lowering of CSP 
targets raises concern. Further, the steep reductions in 
subsidies assume the existence of coordinating mechanisms 
via institutional learning, but there is little evidence of, or 
provision for, such mechanisms.  
V. KEY FINDINGS 
The narrative policy reconstruction and the analytical 
representations presented above draw out important 
perspectives on the overall problem, namely: policy context, 
project planning, and technology choice. While each of the 
perspectives we have presented above provide some view of 
the issues at hand, it is difficult to obtain an overall 
aggregate sense of “the problem.”  Put differently, there 
may well be many problems “local” to any aspect of the 
overall issues at hand, but we have yet to obtain a coherent 
sense of the “problems” on the ground. Table 1 reviews 
each project phases and its corresponding re-readiness. 
 
Table 1. Comparing Plans for RE-Readiness 
 August 2008 
Plan 
May 2009  
Plan 
January 
2010 Plan 
Project 
Features 
Basic RE 
Deployment 
Policy supports - 
subsidies 
New 
technology 
choice 
RE-
Readiness 
Important 
declarative step 
but low on 
policy 
mechanisms 
Inclusion of 
partial but 
incomplete logic 
for policy 
mechanisms and 
planning 
limitations 
Changing 
technology 
choice yet 
potential 
scope 
reduction  
Supply 
Demand Gap 
Higher on 
supply by 
limited demand  
Subsidies 
driving demand 
but supply 
problems remain 
Change in 
both supply 
and demand, 
though no 
connection 
 
The results of our investigations in the UAE have 
yielded some important conclusions related to policy and 
RE-readiness. We conclude by signaling four critical 
observations: First, the decision to support renewable 
energy development is declarative at best, and remains to be 
fully articulated in its more fundamental and operational 
terms. Second, because the policy seemed to be adopted on 
a stand-alone basis – and a target identified in seemingly 
arbitrary terms – it is difficult to anchor the policy or the 
target in a framework that is consistent with national 
objectives. Third, since a project-based approach has 
dominated discussion in the area of renewable energy, by 
necessity these discussions remain unconnected to the 
remainder of the country’s policy plans and are largely de-
contextualized. In essence, the UAE is trying to develop an 
additional energy asset—namely renewable energy 
sources—to augment its core energy resources. Fourth, at a 
very minimum, this and all other policy initiatives must be 
viewed not on a standalone basis, or in terms of project-
based validity, but rather in the context of an overall 
integrated asset management strategy. The authoritative 
plans for the country’s future are framed more in terms of 
general blueprints than in terms of operational strategies. If 
enhancing the country’s energy assets by introducing 
renewable options is truly a major objective, then its 
feasibility is contingent on a coherent and integrated 
strategy.   
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